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The  treatment  of  know-how  licensing under  the  competition  rules 
1.  Importance  of  know-how  transfer  in  the  context  of  the  Community's  policies 
in  the  technological  field 
The  transfer of  know-how  is  an  important  complement  to all the  Community's 
policies  in  the  technological  field  Ce.g.  ESPRIT,  RACE,  BRITE).  These 
policies  are  based  on  the  need  to  improve  substantially  cross-frontier 
transfers cf technology  within  Europe  by  means  of  research  and  development 
cooperation  and  the  subsequent  dissemination of  the  results  through  patent 
and  know-how  Licences  to  other  Community  companies  and  sectors.  The 
development  of  Europec:tn-sourced  technology  from  the  Community's  vast 
technological  ~otP.ntial  wilt  also  help  to  reduce  technological  dependency 
on  third  countries. 
lt should  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  transfer of  technology,  irrespective 
of  whether  or  not  it is protected  by  patents,  is  a  highly  complex  proces\ 
of  assimilation  and  adaptation  of  know-how  which  requires  close  mutual 
understanding  between  the  companies  involved.  These  characteristic' 
peculiar to  know-how  transfer have  to be  taken  into account  when  assessing 
the  agreements  in question  under  Article 85. 
I 
C~mpetition  stimulate~  the  innovative  capacity  of  Community  industry.  On 
the  oth~r hand,  competition policy should facilitate  cooperation aimed  at 
the  devel.opment  and  dissemination  of  new  technologies,  to the  extent. that 
this orens  up  new  markets,  creates  new  competitors  and  products  and  thus 
strengthens  competition.  For  this purpose,  it is indispensable to define 
uhich  forms  of  contractual  arrangements  are  compatible  with  the 
competition  rules,  so  as  to provide  th~ necessary  legal  certainty. 
The  CC'mmi ss  i ""  has  already  shown  a  favourable  attitude  to  technology 
transfer  in  the  Research  and  Development  and  Patent  Licensing  Regulations. . .  ....... 
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2.  Definition of  know-how 
The  term  know-how  is  generally  employed  in  business  to  denote  any 
knowledge  relating  to the  use  of  a  method  of  manufacture  or to the  use  or 
application  ~f  an  industrial  process,  or  any  experience  in  technical, 
commercial,  :administrative, ffnancial  or other sectors that  is applied  in 
~usiness pra6tice.  Council  Regulation  19/65  refers  in  less  broad  terms  to 
"a  m.ethort  of  manufacture  or  knowledge  relating  to  the  use  or  to  the 
application  bf  industrial  proccesses." This  document  however  is concerned 
with  industrial  know-how  which,  for  thP.  purpose  of  discussion,  may  broadly 
be  described  as  substantial  technological  information  relating  to  the 
whote  or  a  part  of  a  manufacturing  process  or  a  product,  or  to  the 
rtevelopment  th~reof,  which  is  not  in  the  public  domain  and  therefore 
justifies  efforts  to  maintain  its  secrecy  and  which  is  valuable  to  the 
prospective  licensee. 
The  term  "substantial"  is  intended  to exclude  information  that  is trivial 
'  or obvious.  The  notion  "not  in  the  public  domain"  does  not  mean  that  the 
know-how  must  be  totally unobtainable.  It may  even  be  the  case  that  each 
individual  component  of  the  know-how  packaJe  is  known  to  qualified 
engineers  in  the  sector but  that  the  precise  configuration and  assembly  of 
components  and  features  which  make  the  technology  work  is  not  readily 
available.  The  notion  "efforts  to  maintain  its  secrecy"  means  that  the 
know-how  possessor  must  take  steps  which  are  reasonable  under  the 
circumstances  to  ensure  that  this  knowledge  does  not  become  gener.ally 
known  to  the  public.  The  term  "valuable"  is  taken  to  mean  that  the 
know-how  is  of  decisive  importance  to  the  licensee  in  starting  up 
production  rapidly  using  a  working  technology  for  which  he  is  therefore 
~illinq to oay  royalties. 
Know-how  "''hi ch  relates  not  to  technology  as  such  but  to  other  matters 
indispen«inble  to  the  proper  exploitation  of  the  technology  may  in  this 
r.onte~t  b~ treated  in  the  same  way.  For  example,  it  may  be  necessary  in 
certain  circumstances  to  provide  the  licensee  with  essP.ntial  information 
c~ncerning  the  characteristics  of  raw  materials,  the  storage  and 
conservation of  the  final  product, etc. 
I .... 
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Pure  mark~ting  know-how  and  know-how  communicated  under  subcontracts  or 
commercial  franchising  arrangements  should  be  excluded  from  the  scope  of a 
regulation  or  guidelines.  ~now-how  licences  connected  with  other 
agreements  or  practices  between  the  contracting  parties  such  as  research 
and  dPvelopment  cooperation,  joint  ventures,  patent  pools  and  other 
cros~-licensing arrangements  should  also  be  outside  the  scope  of  such  an 
instrument.  Any  regulation  should  apply  to  simple  one-way  agreements, 
covering  all  or  a  part  of  th~  common  mar~et,  whether  exclusive  or  not, 
""hich  disclose  thP.  know-ho\r.'  to  the  other  party  for  use  in  production; 
agreements  re~arding  selling  alone  would  be  excluded,  except  in  cases 
~here  the  l i cenc;or  undertakes  to  supply  the  contract  products  to  the 
licensee  for  a  preliminary  period  before  the  licensee  himself  commences 
production. 
3.  Need  for  comparable  treatment  of  patent  licences  and  know-how  agreements, 
under  the  competition  rules 
The  patent  system  is  generally  recognised  as  being  the  best  legal  means 
available  for  the  promotion  of  technical  progress  in the  public  tnterest. 
Given  the  stringent  requirements  of  the  patent  system  itself  (public 
disclosure  and  examination  of  patentability)  it  can  generally  be  assumed 
that  a  patent  involves  technical  knowledge  of  an  objectively high  quality. 
In  contrast  to patents,  know-how  may  involve  elements  which  are not  worthy 
of  patent  protection,  its  novelty  and  substantial  value  have  not  been 
tested  by  a  public  aut~ority  and  there  is  a  danger  that  cartel-minded 
firms  could  make  irrelevant  technical  data  the  subject  of  spurious 
know-how  licences,  their main  objective being  to obtain official approval 
for  disguised market-sharing  agreements  and  other  restrictive practices. 
However,  wheth~r there  is  real  substance  or  subterfuge  in  know-how  licence 
restraints  can  be  ascertained  by  requiring  that,  to  comply  with 
competition  rutes,  the  know-how  granted  must  satisfy  sufficiently  high 
standards.  Bnth  patents  and  substantial,  not  publicly  know  and  valuable 
know-how  are,  notwithstanding  their  substantial  differences  of  legal 
status,  essential  factors  in  technological  progress  and  competitivity and 
hoth  know-how  agr~ements  and  patent  licences  should  enjoy  comparable 
favourabl~  treatment  und~r  the  competition  rules.  This  is  apparent  from 
th~ fol.lowing  : - 4  -
~)  Know-how  can,  and  often  does,  have  an  economic  value  equal  to  or 
greater  than  that  of  patents;  its  development  and  exploitation  on  an 
industrial  scale  can  be  extremely costly and  complicated. 
The  large  sums  spent  by  industry  on  research  and  development  are  not 
necessarily  di r~cted  at  or  likely  to  lead  to  patentable  inventions. 
Research  and  development  effort  is  mostly  directed  at problem-solving, 
and  exa~ples  from  several  industrial  sectors  suggest  that  only about  a 
ouarter  of  research  and  development  results  end  up  in  patent 
applications.  Non-patented  results  can  be  a  major  determinant of firms' 
competitive  advantage.  With  the  pace  of  technological  change,  the 
possession of  or  immediate  access  to  the  latest  technology  is  the  key 
tC\  success  in  the  market.  This  is  especially  the  case  in 
high-technology  sectors. 
b)  Tn  line with  its importance  as  a  determinant  of  competitive  advantage} 
know-how.  plays  an  indispensable  role  in  technology  licensing.  Thi~ 
applies  not  only to  pure  know-how  agreements,  which  generally  account 
I 
for  a  third of  all  licensing  agreements,  but  also to  mixed  agreements 
in  which  a  patent  licence  is  granted  along  with  the  transfer  of  .  I 
~now-how: !n practice, the  ~oundary between  the  two  types  of  agreements 
is fluid:  This  is  for  example  the  case  where  a  patent  licensed with  the 
know-how  has  only  been  aoplied  for  at  the  time  of  licensing  and  is 
subseoul!nt ly  not  granted,  or  where  the  licensed  patent  expires,  is 
declared  invalid or  is  lost  for  any  other  reason  while  the  transfer of 
the  know-how  continues.  Such  conversions  of  mixed  into  pure  know-how 
agreements  are  not  uncommon. 
These  considerations  alone  make  it  clear  that  a  generally  less 
favourable  treatment  of  know-how  than  patent  Licences  under  the 
r.t~mpetition  rules  would  be  unjustified  and  would  lead  to  unwarranted 
distinctior.s  between  different  constitutive  elements  of  a  given 
technolo~y  bein~ licensed. - 5  -
Indf?ed,  there  are  considerations  that  could  arguably  support  a  less 
restrictive  approach  under. the  competition  rules  to  know-how  than  to 
patent  licences.  On  the  one  hand,  whereas  patented technology  is,  by 
definition,  fully  disclosed and  subject  to  compulsory  licences,  in the 
event  of  inadequate exploitation,  and  to unlimited use  once  the patent 
expires,  know-how  may  be  hoarded  for  ever  from  the  public  unless  its 
possessor  is  wilting  to  license.  Whilst  the  hoarding  of  know-how  may 
only  occur  infrequently,  the danger  of  hoarding  makes  it in  the public 
interest  to  have  a  positive  climate  for  know-how  licences.  Furthermore, 
whereas  secret  know-how  does  not  have  the  beneficial  effects  of 
publicatior as  i"  the  case  of  patents, the  absence  of  patent protection 
min;mizes  the  effect  of  restrictive  clauses  in  know-how  licences,  as 
t~e  know-how  possessor  has  no  absolute  right  to  exclude  third  parties 
from  independently  discoveri~g and  exploiting  the  same  technology  and 
~as tc  rely only  on  s~crecy. 
In  the  light  of  the  above  consideration,  this  paper  suggests  that 
contractual  restrictions  on  competition  between  licensors  and  licensees 
/and  between  licensees  inter  se/  in  know-how  licences,  in  particular 
te~ritorial  restrictions,  should  be  approached  in  the  same  way  as  in 
patent  licences  under  the  Patent  Licensing  Regulation,  due  regard  being 
had  to  their  particular  features.  The  reasons,  relating  to  the 
protection of  investment  and  the  wider  dissemination of  technology,  for 
allowing  varying  degrees  of  territorial  protection  as  between. the 
licensor and  the  licensee  /and  as  between  licensees  inter se/ that  have 
been  acknowledged  in the  Patent  Licensing  Regulation  do  not  become  less 
v~Lid only  because  the  know-how  possessor  enjoys  less  extensive  legal 
protection  than  the  patent-holder. 
It  is  !;10St  important  in  this  context  that  know-how  can  be  protected 
only  bv  cnntra~t  when  licensed.  A  prohibition  of  indispensable 
contrar.tvat  provisions  in  know-how  licences  could  impede  or  inhibit the 
lic~ns!  ~f  k~ow-~ow. 
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4.  Response  ~f policy to economic  realities 
The  Commission  considers  that  such  an  approach  would  respond  to  the 
following  competitive  purpose~  and  objective  needs  of  industry  without 
coming  intc  r.onflict  with  the  general  aims  of the patent  system  : 
From  the  competition policy point  of  view,  the  license of  know-how  has  a 
direct  pro-competitive  ~ffect:  a  know-how  licence  creates  new  or 
increased  co~petition because  with  the  licensed technology  the  licensee 
is  3ble  to  market  a  product  which  competes  with  existing  comparable 
products  Pven  in the  areas  of  non-patentable  improvements.  An  indirect 
oro-competit;ve effect will  al~o come  about,  as  after the expiration of 
any  temporary  contractual  limitations,  competition  between  licensor, 
licensee  and  other  license~s  will  occur.  The  know-how  licence  may  also 
increase  the  number  of  production  facilities  and  the  quantity  of  goods 
produced  in  the  common  market.  Furthermore,  it  facilitates  the 
penetration  of  new  markets,  ~ince  the  licensing  of  a  firm  in  another1 
country  offers  ~n  attractive  middle  ground  between  exporting  and  the 
risks  of  direct  foreign  investment  and  marketing.  In  particular, 
licensing  may  heln  to  overcome  problems  related  to non-tariff  barriers 
and  national  public  procurement  policies.  Also,  know-how  licensing 
usually  leads  to  an  evP.n  greater transfer or  exchange  of  technology,  as 
the  licensee  mostly  receives  a  complete  package·  of  the  licensor's 
knowledge. 
- A licensor  transferring  his  technology  creates  a  competitor  capabl~ of 
producing  identical  products  of  the  same  quality  and  technological 
standard.  In  economic  reality therefore,  a  company  cannot  be  expected  to 
act  against  its  own  business  interests  by  granting  a  know-how  licence 
without  providing  for  reasonable  protection  from  competition  by  the 
licenseP.  in  its  cwn  market.  For  his  part,  the  licensee  will  normally 
only  a~re~ to  take  the  licence  and  to undertake  the necessary  investment 
if  r~aso~able protection  from  the  licensor  /and  other  licensees/  is 
provided  for  in  the  contract. - 7  -
Prov"sions  for  such  protection  only  relate  to  the  use  of  the  licenced 
technolo~y or  the  products  made  from  such  technology.  Thus,  they  do  not 
impos~  restraints  in  existinf,J  markets  but  only  limit  the  competition 
created by  th~ licence. 
- Allowing  the  possessors  of  know-how  to protect  their  Legitimate business 
interests  within  reasonable  limits  should  not  substantially  influence 
the  propensity of  companies  to  make  their  inventions public  by  applying 
for  patents. 
Developers  of  a  patentable  invention  may  in  particular  cases  have 
serious  reasons  for  not  applyi~g for  patents,  for  example  when  the  life 
cycle  of  the  technology  concerned  is so  short  that  it is not  appropriate 
to  seek  protection  for  every  technological  development  or  when  they 
might  n~t  have  the  financial  means  at  their  disposal  or  might  not  wish  . 
to obtain  a·nd  maintain  patent· protection  in every  Member  State.  In  these 
cases  the  decision  not  to  obtain  patent  protection  does  not  mean  that 
the  processor  of  know-how  is  seeking  to  circumvent  the  patent  laws. 
However,  g~ven  a  straight  c•oice  between  statutory  protection  and  the 
ve~y  fr~gile  protection  afforded  to  know-how,  which  is  vulnerable  to 
outside  discovery  and  publication,  they  might  continue  to  seek  patent 
coverage. 
5.  Provisions  frequently  contained  in  know-how  licensing agreements 
ThP  following  analysis  deals with  the  contractual  clauses  usually included 
in  know-how  agreements.  The  Commission  should  state  how  it  would  assess 
these  clauses  in  relation to  Article 85. 
Some  of  these  clauses  will  not  normally  fall  under  Article  85C1>;  others 
may  fall  under  Article  85C1)  but  may  be  exempted  under  Article  85(3)  in 
individual  decisions  or  by  a  future  block  exemption  regulation,  in  so  far 
and  as  t.onc  as  the  know-how  has  not  entered  into the  public  domain.  If a 
hl~ck  e~emption  regulation  w~re  adopted,  its  structure  could  follow 
clos~l~'  theo  ?at~nt  Licensin~  Regulation  in  giving  a  list  of  obligations 
• . . . 
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1  normally  caught  by  Article  85<1>  which  would  be  exempted  by  the 
Regulation,  a  list setting forth  those  obligations not  normally  deemed  to 
involve  restrictions  of  competition,  and  a  "blacklist"  of  provisions  or 
restrictions  whose  presence  will  make  the  exemption  unavailable.  An 
opposition  procedurP  could  also  be  provided  for. 
6.  Obligations  which  are  normally  considered  not  to fall  under  Article 85  (1) 
i)  Obligation  to preserve  secrecy 
All  obligations  imposed  on  the  licensee  to  take  any  steps  necessary to 
protect  the  know-how  from  losing  its  secrecy  can  be  regarded  as 
inherent  in  the  transfer  and  thus  not  falling  under  Article  85.  The 
obligation  not  to divulge  the  know-how  can  also  be  extended  beyond  the 
expiry  of  the  agreement  as  long  as  the  know-how  has  not  entered  the 
public  domain. 
ii)  Obligations  not  to  sub-license 
Obligations  on  the  licensee  not  to  grant• sub-licences  without  the 
consent  of  the  licensor are  related to the  secrecy obligation.  They  are 
justified  in  the  context  ol the  licensee's  obligation  to  preserve  the 
possession  and  the  secrecy  of  the  licensed  know-how.  This  obligation 
can  aLso  be  extended  beyond  the  term  of  the  licence  as  long  as  the 
know-how  has  not  entered the  public  domain. 
iii) Obligations  relating to  improvements  in the  know-how 
Arrangements  for  the  reciprocal  non-exclusive  communication  of 
improvements  between  licensor  and  licensee  <non-exclusive  grant-back>, 
on  a  royalty-free basis or otherwise,  are generally not  restrictive.of 
competition..  The  relevant  question  in  this  context  is  the  extent  to 
~hich  the  licensee  can  freely  exploit  his  own  improvements  of  the 
know-how  initially transferred. 
I 
Fir~tly,  it  ~hotJLd be  provided  that  the  licensee  may  not  be  prevented 
from  usin~  th~m, L!t  least  during  the  validity of  the  contrac!/ or  from. 
licensing  them  to  third  parties  as  long  as  such  licensing  does  not 
disclose  the  original  know-how  of  the  licensor that  is still secret. • 
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Secondl)',  the  question  whether  the  licensee  must  also  be  free  to· 
sub-license  to  third parties  the  original  know-how  where  that  know-how 
is  indispensable  for  the  exploitation  of  the  licencee's  own 
improvem~nts may  give  rise to difficult  issues. 
Different  interests  are  involved  here  :  from  the  public  interest 
standpoint  it  appears  desirable  to  secure  the  largest  possible 
dissemination of  any  ne'~  ideas,  including  improvements  by  the  licensee. 
On  the  other  hand,  the fact  cannot  be  ignored  that  such  sub-licensing 
to possibly  a  large number  of third parties poses  a  much  greater danger 
that  the  secrets  become  known  and  the  licensor  loses  every~hing.  To 
refuse  the  licensor  the  right  to  prevent  such  sub-licensing  would 
constitute  a  major  exception  to  the  permissibility  of  obligations 
designed  to  preserve the  confidentiality of  received  know-how.  As,  but 
for  the  licence,  the  licensee would  not  have  the  confidential  know-how 
to  build  upon  in  future  development  activities,  it  is  therefore 1 
suggested  that  such  refusal  is not  justified.  Furthermore,  it is  likely 
that  no  substantial  hindrance  to  subsequent  transfers  of  technology 
will  result  from  allowing  the  former  licensor  discretion  over 
sub-licensing,  for  a  licensee  who  has  developed  improvements  will  be  in 
a  strong  b:H·gaining  position  to  obtain  the  licensor's  consent  for 
sub-licensing.  Not  only  will  such  sub-licensing  increase  the  flow  of 
royalties to  the  licensor,  but  the  licensee  may  be  able  to obtain the 
licensor •  s  consent  for  sub-licensing  in  return  for  a  grant-back  of 
substantial  improvements  which  will  enable  the  licensor to  exploit  the 
very  latest  technolo9y. 
iv>  Obligations  concerning quality standards  and  specifications 
Obligations  imposed  on  the  licensee  to  meet  certain  minimum 
specifications  and  quality standards  in the  production of  the  licensed 
products  should  not  be  regarded  as  restrictive of  competition  provided 
that  th~v  s~rve to  maintain  the  technological  and  quality image  of the 
l-icensor.  This  will  only  be  the  case  when  the  product  bears  the 
lic~nsor's trade  mark  or  identifies the  licensor  in  some  other way. - 10 -
v)  Royalties 
In  principle,  the  contracting parties should  be  left free  to negotiate 
the  level  of  royalties  and  initial  down-payments  and  the  distribution 
of  royalties  over  time.  Normally  the  licensor  will  be  interested  in 
receiving  high  initial  lump  sums  and  royalties  during  the  first  few 
)'E'a rs  of  the  licence.  The  Licensee,  on  the  other  hand,  will  be 
interested  in  minimizing  initial  costs  until  production  and  marketing 
of  the  licensed  product  have  reached  full  scale.  As  a  compromise 
between  these  two  positions,  arrangements  designed  to  spr~ad payments 
of  a  fixed  sum  over  a  given  period  which  may  even  extend  beyond  the 
ertry  of  the  know-how  into  the  public  domain  are  in  the  nature  of  an 
installment  plan  and  therefore  need  not  be  considered  restrictive  of 
ct'mnetition. 
On~ of  the  more  controversial  aspects  of  know-how  licensing,  however, 
is  whether  a  licensee  can  be  forced  to  pay  royalties  in  the  form  of 
percentages  of  turnover  after  the  technology  has  become  public 
knowledge  and  is  being  used  royalty-free  by  competitors.  It  is  clear 
that  in  a  patent  licence  royalties  cannot  be  charged  after  expiry  of 
the  patent  <unless  by  payment  in  instalments  over  time>.  In  a  mixed 
patent  and  know-how  agreement  there  may  be  a  danger  that  the  know-how 
is  simply  used  as  a  pretext  to  require  royalties  on  the  expired 
oatents,  in  which  case  payment  of  royalties  cannot  legitimately  be 
required.  However,  in pure  know-how  licences there would  be  no  improper 
extension  of  a  legal  monopoly  an~ the  fact  that  the  know-how  had  become 
oublic  should  not  in  itsPlf  be  governed  by  the  rule on  patents,  i.e. 
the  prevention  of  continuation  of  the  licensee's  obligation  to  pay 
royalties. 
The  following  solutions  appear  possible  :  Firstly,  the  parties  can 
agrE'e  that  entry  into  the  public  domain  terminates  the  licence  or 
otherwise  eliminates  the  necessity to pay  royalties.  Secondly,  where 
the  part~es  have  not  so  agreed,  it  could  be  envisaged  that  an 
"bli~ation  on  the  licensee  to  keep  paying  royalties  until  the  end  of 
the  contract  should  not  be  considered  restrictive  of  competition,  if 
parties  have  agreed  a  reasonably  limited  duration  with  the  option  at 
t~e  end  of  the  contract  either  to  renew  the  licence,  should  the - 11  -
technolo~y  still  be: secret,  or  to  continue  to  use  the  licensed 
technology  on  a  royalty•free basis  should it no  longer  be  secret.  The 
same  would  apply  if,·:'irrespective  of  the  duration  of  the  agreement, 
parties  agree  that  payments  are  still  due  for  a  limited  period  after 
the  l!ntry  of  the  technology  into,  the  public  domain.  Such  a  period 
should  generally  not  ~xceed~hree  year~  as  an  obligation  to  keep  on 
paying  for  a  longer  o.r  indefinite  period  would  ultimately  place  the 
licenseP.  at  a  disa~vantage  with  competitors  freely  using  the 
technology.  ·.~· 
1  ..  .  , 
The  reasoning  behind  this  solution  is  as  follows:  The  licensor  should 
not  be  obliged  to  assume  all  the  risk  of  a  premature  entry  of  his 
know-how  into the  public  domain,  i.e., either  litigation costs to prove 
that  it  is  still  secret  or  has  entered  the  public  domain  through  the 
fault  or  even  by  a  deliberate  act  of  the  licensee,  or  the  loss  of  a 
substantial  part  of  the ·agreed  royalties  in the  event  of  disclosure of I 
the  know-how  by  third parties.  If  he  were  obliged to  run  this risk,  he 
would  either  prefer  not  to  l"icense  at  all  or  would  insist  ~n  heavy 
down-payments  and  high  initial  royalties.  This  would  discourage  the 
licensee from  taking the  licence.  When  a  licence is freely negotiated, 
the price  agreed  reflects  the  risks  which  the  parties  are  prepared  to 
share,  including  the  risk  that  the  know-how  might  enter  the  public 
domain  during  the  life  of  the  contract.  The  value  of  the  licensed 
know-how  consists  in  giving  the  licensee  a  lead-time  over  his 
com~etitors to  whom  the  same  or  equivalent  technology  is not  availaBle. 
B~ the  time  he  could  develop  the  know-how  himself,  the  technology might 
be  out  of  date.  He  is therefore paying  primarily a  negotiated price for 
this  lead  time. 
However,  if  the  know-how  has  fallen  in  the  public  domain  through  the 
action  of  the  licensor,  the  licensee  should  be  freed  from  his 
obligation to pay  royalties. - 12  -
Furthermore,  the  contr~ct  may  frequently  not  only  cover  the 
communication  of  know-how  not  in  the  public  domain,  but  the  know-how 
possessor  may  have  also  supplied  other  non-secret  information  or  work 
over  Pond  above  it,  whi~h  continues  to  be  important  for  the  licensee 
<e.g.  technical  assistan~e).  In  these cases, whilst  other competitive 
restraints  on  the  licensee  should  no  longer  be  covered  by  a  block 
exe"'ption  from  the  time:.·the  know-how  has  entered  the  public  domain, 
royalty  pay~ents could  still be  lawfully agreed  for  a  limited period of 
tiffle. 
vi)  Minimum  quantity 
An  obligation on  the  licensee  to produce  a  reasonable  minimum  quantity 
of  products  derived  from  the  licensed  know-how  serves  to  ensure  an 
effective  exploitation  of  the  know-how  and  meets  a  legitimate interest 
of  the  licensor. 
• 
7.  Clauses  which  may  normally  be  considered  to fall  within Article 85(1) 
i)  Field of  use  1 
Modern  te~chnology  is  strongly  characterized  by  its  interdisciplinary 
and  intersectorial application.  Allowing  a  restriction on  the  licensee 
to  use  the  know-how  only  in  certain  technical  fields  of  application 
gives  an  incentive  to  the  licensor  to  disseminate  technology  in  other 
sectors.  This  will  result  in.  ne~ applications  and  products.  Meanwhile, 
the  licensor  can  reserve  for  himself  the  fields  in  which  he  is 
primarily  interest~d.  tn  particular,  field-of-use  restrictions allow 
smaller  firms  to  license  their  technology  to  large  companies  for 
applirations  in  other  fields  while  k~eping for  themselves  the  areas  in 
which  they  can  apply  their  own  technology  without  the  threat  of 
competitio"'  which  the  greater  financial  resources  of  their  licensees 
~ould  oth~rwi~e make  possi~le. 
~· 
·, . ,  ~ 
I 
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Such  restrictions  can  fall  under  Article  85(1)  as  they  prevent  the 
licensee  from  using  the  know-how  in  the excluded  fields  of  use  and  thus 
from  manufacturing  and  selling  the products  incorporating  the  licensed 
•  -·  technology,  but  they can  normally  be  exempted  under  Article 85(3).  An 
obligation  on  the  Licensor  not  to exploit  the  know-how  within  the field 
of  use  granted  to the  licensee  may  be  examined  in the  general  context 
of exclusivity obligations dealt  with  in point  Cv>  below. 
Fi~ld-of-use  restrictions  which  amount  to  de  facto  customer 
restrictions fall  to be  considered  under  Cii)  below. 
ii)  Customer  restrictions 
Restrictions  in  respect  of  sharing  customers  within  the  same 
technological  field  of  use,  either  by  an  actual  prohibition  on 
supplying  certain  classes  of  customer  or  an  obligation  with  an 1 
equivalent  effect,  cannot  be  exempted  under  a  block  exemption.  An • 
exception might  be  allowed  where  a  second  supplier  is needed  either to 
provide  a  second  source  of  supply  at  the  customer's  insistence  or 
because  the  first  suppliir  cannot  satisfy  the  totality  of  the 
customer' I  demand.  Such  cases  should  be  examined  on  a  case-by-case 
basis. 
iii)  Price  restrictions 
Restrictions  on  the  price  at  which  the  licensee  can  sell  the  licensed 
products  are  normally  unacceptable.  They  should  be  blacklisted  ih  a 
future  block  exemption  regulation. 
iv)  Quantity restrictions 
Quantity  restrictions  are  normally  unacceptable  and  should  be 
blacklisted.  However,  an  exemption  might  be  envisaged  when  the  licensee 
wants  to produce  only  enough  of  the  product  to  cover  his  own  needs,  or 
when  the  licence  is granted for  the purpose  of  creating a  second  source 
of  supply  ~s  mentioned  in  (ii)  above. - 14  -
v>  Automatic  extension  of  the  agreement  by  the  licensor  to  cover 
improvements  not  originally 'licensed 
The  exemption  will  be  unavai table  if  the  agreement  provides  for  the 
automatic  extension  of  the  licence  beyond  its  original  term  by 
inclusiof"l  of  any  improvement  obtained  by  the  licensor,  unless  each 
party  has  the  right  to terminate  the  agreement  at  least  annually after 
expiry of  the  original  term. 
vi)  Exclusivity of  use  and  territorial  restrictions 
- Economic  reasons  for  exclusivity and  territorial  restrictions 
The  licensor  may  find  it difficult to  transfer his  know-how  if  he  is 
unable  to  promise  a  licensee  that  he  will  not  encounter  competition 
from  other  licensees  or  the  licensor  himself  in  the  allotted 
territory.  The  licensee  will  be  unwilling  to  undertake  the  risk  of 
tt,e  investment  and  marketing  co~ts  involved  in  the  introduction  of 
the  licensed  product  in  the  market  if  exclusivity  of  manufacturing 
and  sale for  a  given  territory is not  guaranteed  by  the  licensor. 
The  same  is true  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  licensor,  who  would  be 
actinq  against  his  business  interests if by  licensing  his  technology 
he  created a  direct  competitor  in his  reserved territory. 
Several  arguments  in  favour  of  territorial  restrictions  put  for~ard 
in  the  recitals of the Patent  Licensing  Regulation  are  also valid for 
know-how  licencPs;  for  example  : 
- Protection of  the  licensee's  investment  and  marketing efforts; 
- Territori~l restrictions encourage  the  licensor to grant  licences and 
make  the  licensees  more  inclined to undertake  the  investment  required 
to ma"ufacture  and  market  a  new  product; 
- The  resulting  increase  in the  number  of  production facilities  and  in 
the  quantity and  quality of  goods  produced  in the  common  market; \ 
- 15  - \ 
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- Consum~rs are  as  a  rule  allowed  a  fair  share of  the benefit  resulting 
from  the  improvement  in the  supply of  goods  incorporating  the  latest 
technology; 
Competition  at  the  distribution  level  is  safeguarded  by  the 
p~ssibility of  parallel  imports. 
- Territorial exclusivity 
Exclusive  licensing  agreements,  i.e.  agreements  whereby  the  licensor 
undertakes  not  to  exploit  the  licensed  know-how  in  the  licensed 
territory  himself  or  to  grant  further  licences  there,  do  not  in 
themselves  fall  within  Article  85(1)  where  they  are  concerned  with  the 
protection of  new  technology  in  the  licensed territory. This  is because, 
in  such  cases,  the  competition  eliminated would  not  have  existed at all 
without  the  licensing agreement. 
Where,  in  other  r.ircumstances,  exclusivity  provisions  do  fall  within 
Article  85<1>,  they  should  be  exemptable  under  Article  85(3).  The 
Commission  would,  as  in  the  Patent  Licensing  Regulation,  permit  varying 
degrees  of  territorial  protection  as  between  the  licensor  and  the 
licensee  /and  as  between  licensees  inter  s~/ and  make  exemption  subject 
to  the  following  conditions  : 
- The  period  during  which  the  licensor  undertakes  not  to  grant  further 
licences  in  the  licensed  territory  or  to  manufacture  in  and  export 
directly to the  licensed territory himself  should  generally not  exceed 
ten years  from  the  date  when  the product  is first placed  on  the market 
within  the  EEC,  as  this period is generally considered  in  industry to 
be  the  normal  life of  know-how  agreements. 
- The  agreement  should  enable  the  licensor to  terminate the  exclusivity 
on  the expiry of  a  period of  five years  from  the date of the agreement 
if,  without  legitimate  reason,  the  licensee  fails  to  exploit  the 
technology  adequately. - 16 -
Territorial  restrictions on  the  licensee 
Know-how  licence  agreements.may  provide  for  territorial  restrictions on 
the  licensee.  Obligations  on  the  licensee  not  to  manufacture  or  sell 
products  derived  from  the  licensed  technology  in  territories  reserv.ed 
for  the  licensor  and  not  to  manufacture  or  make  active  ~nd passive/ 
sales of  such  products  in  the territories  of  other  licensees  should  be 
exemptable  under  Article  85(3).  The  Commission  would  make  exemption 
subject  to the  following  conditions: 
- The  duration  of  obligations  on  the  licensee  not  to manufacture  in or 
export  products  derived  from  the  licensed  technology  to  the  territory 
of  the  licensor should  generally not  exceed i!en/  years  from  the date 
when  the  products  concerned  were  first placed  on  the market  within  the 
EEC. 
- The  duration  of  obligations  on  the  licensee  not  to  make  active Land 
passiv!/ sales of  products  derived  from  the  licensed technology  in the 
territories  of  other  licensees  should  generally  not  exceed  five  years 
from  the  date  when  the  products  concerned  were  first  placed  on  the 
market  within  the  EEC. 
- An  obligation  on  the  licensee not  to use  the  know-how  for  manufacture 
in  the  territories of  the other  licensees  should  generally not  exceed 
!!e~/  years.  Such  a  restriction  has  acceptable  anti-competjtive 
effects,  since the  licensee would  be  free  to sell the products  in the 
territories of  other  licensees after five  years. 
These  cut-off dates  should  give  the  licensee sufficient time  to  recoup 
the  r.ost  of  his  investment  in  development,  full-scale  production  and 
introduction  of  the  product  on  to  the  market  and  would  also  be 
considered  by  the  licensor  as  being  a  sufficiently  long  period  in 
which  he  •..rould  not  be  exposed  to  competition  from  his  licensee. 
Longer-lasting territorial  restrictions  could  mean  that  a  substantial 
part  of  the  benefit  connected  with  the  licence  would  not  occur  or 
would  he  neutralized  by  anti-competitive effects. - 17  -
A specific  problem  arises  in  licences  covering  a  continuous  stream  of 
improvements  of  know-how.  It  is  proposed  that  the  addition  of 
improvements  to the  l~censed technology  should  not  entail an  extension 
of  the  period  of  protection.  To  allow  an  additional  period  of 
territorial  protection  every  time  a  further  transfer  of  improvements 
takes  place  would  result  in  an  open-ended  restriction. 
In  no  event  can  any  prevention  or  hindrance  of  parallel  imports  be 
allowed.  Since  competition  at the distribution stage is ensured  by  the 
possibility of parallel  imports,  know-how  agreements  will not  normally 
afford  any  possibility  of  eliminating  competition  in  respect  of  a 
substantial  part  of  the  products  in  question.  This  is also  true  of 
agreements  that  allocate to the  licensee a  contract  territory covering 
the whole  of  the  common  market.  However,  in this case  intermediaries 
or  users  should  not  be  prevented  by  the  parties  from  obtaining  the 
contract  goods  from  outside  the  common  market.  In  relation  to 
services,  in  which  there  is  no  parallel  trade,  it  is essential  to  .-
provide  that  requiring the  licensee, after any  initial period in which 
a  territorial  restraint would  be  permitted,  not  to  provide  a  service 
in  terri ttri  es  licensed  to  other  licensees  within  the  common  market 
would  preclude  application of  the block  exemption. 
vii). Non-competition  clause 
Obligations  which  restrict  the  licensee's  freedom  to  compete  with  the 
licensor  in  respect  of  research  and  development,  manufacture,  and  use·or 
sale  of  products  based  on  technologies  other  than  those  licensed 
normally  fall  under  the  prohibition  of  Article  85  because  of  their 
tendency  to  exclude  competing  technologies.  The  prohibition  of  such 
restrictions must  however  be  reconciled with  the  legitimate  interest  of 
the  licensor  in  having  his  know-how  exploited to the full.  Accordingly, 
the  licensor  may  require  the  licensee  to  use  his  best  endeavours  to 
manufacture  and  market  the  licensed product.  Such  a  requirement  does  not 
restrict  competition  within  the meaning  of  Article 85(1). - 18  -
viii)  Post-term  prohibition on  licensee's use  of  know-how 
Another  of  the  more  controversial  aspects  of  know-how  licensing  is 
whether  a  licensee  may  be  .required  to  return  at  the  expiry  of  the 
agreement  all  tangible  know-how  to  the  licensor  and  to  stop  using  all 
the  know-how  received,  at  least  as  long  as  it  remains  secret.  This 
clause  can  be  found  in almost  all agreements  which  have  been  notified to 
the  Commission. 
Two  different views  are generally taken  on  this question  : 
It  can  be  argued  that  it  acts  as  a  strong  disincentive  to  prospective 
licensees  and  consequently  cannot  be  exempted  under  Article  85C3>.  The 
reasoning  behind  this view  is  that  by  taking  a  licence  to  the  know-how 
the  licensee  has  lost  for  ever  the  possibility  of  developing,  i.e. 
"rediscovering", the  know-how  himself. 
It  ca~ also  be  argued  that  such  clause  is acceptable.  This  follows  from 
the  recognition  of  the  know-how  licensor's  right  to  dispose  of  the 
know-how  under  contractual  arrangements.  Parties  should  be  free  to 
•  • 
decide  whether  to  regard  the  communication  of  the  know-how  as  a  final, 
irrevocable act  akin  to  a  sale  or  as  a  leasing  relationship  limited  in 
time. 
The  following  solutions are  here  suggested 
Firstly,  parties  should  be  allowed  to  include  such  a  clause  in  an 
agreement  providing  for  use  of  technology  for  a  specific  project  Ce.g.  a 
large-scale  construction  contract).  Refusal  to  allow  a  post-term 
prohibition  on  the  licensee's  use  of  the  licensed  know-how  where  either 
party  would  be  reluctant  to  enter  into  an  agreement  providing  for  a 
transfer  of  technology  for  a  longer  duration  would  inhibit  the 
dissemination  of technology. 
Apart  from  these  specific  cases  a  post-term  use  ban  could  be  generally 
accepted  where  all the following  conditions apply  : '<" ..  .,  ..  .  .  ~ .. 
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- The  prohibition on  the  licensee's  use  is  limited  to L!hree/  years  from 
the  expiry  of  the  agreement.  It  could  be  argued  that  this  period 
corresponds  in  general  to  th~ time  it would  have  taken  the  licensee  to 
develop  the  know-how  himself. 
- The  licensor  is  required  to  identify  and  describe  in  as  much  detail as 
possible the  confidential  information  in the agreement  and  to maintain  a 
record  which  reflects an  accurate  compilation  of  subsequent  confidential 
information  transferred  during  the  course  of  the  agreement.  That  would 
prevent  the  licensee  from  being  unduly  restricted  in the  utilization of 
his  own  technology  or  of  that  which  is  freely  available  elsewhere  and 
would  generally  alleviate  the  problem  of  improvements  added  by  the 
licensee. 
- It  is clearly  stated that  such  a  clause  is  no  longer  allowed  as  soon  as 
the  licensee  can  prove  that the  know-how  has  become  public  knowledge  or 
that  he  has  acquired  know-how  of  identical  content  from  a  third party. 
In  all other  cases  the  clause  should  be  subject  to individual  examination. 
• 